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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—TIGHTENING THE
LOCKS TO THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE—
MAHANOY AREA SCH. DIST. V. B.L., 141 S. CT. 2038
(2021)
The First Amendment protects an individual’s contribution of
speech and expression in America’s marketplace of ideas.1 In its seminal
case regarding student speech, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme Court held that students do not shed their
constitutional right to freedom of speech at the schoolhouse gate, and that
public school officials may only regulate student speech that “materially and
substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline.”2
In Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L.,3 the Supreme Court considered, as an
issue of first impression, the constitutionality of school discipline of off-campus student speech.4 Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s recognition of First Amendment infringement in the discipline of offcampus speech, the Court ruled that public schools have an interest in regulating specific instances of off-campus speech that implicate the school’s
regulatory authority.5
In May 2017, Brandi Levy, a freshman student at Mahanoy Area
High School in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, tried out for the school’s varsity cheerleading team.6 After she was rejected from the varsity cheerleading
team, Levy begrudgingly accepted an offer to join the junior varsity
1
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating persons constitutionally protected in freedom of speech
and expression); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (describing fundamental values in
expression of ideas to American democracy); see also Heather K. Lloyd, Injustice in Our Schools:
Students’ Free Speech Rights Are Not Being Vigilantly Protected, 21 N. III. U. L. REV. 265, 318
(2001) (highlighting classrooms as vital to exchange of ideas); Mike Douse & Philip Uys, Covid19 and Transformation of ‘The School,’ NORRAG BLOG (Sept. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/WXS5PFS3 (“Education is undergoing a fundamental transformation consequent upon the challenges and
possibilities of the Digital Age and responding to the tangible/virtual duality of contemporary consciousness.”)
2
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (outlining
school officials’ authority when actual disruption or forecast of disruption to school activities).
3
141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
4
See id. at 2043 (addressing whether school officials have authority to regulate off-campus
speech).
5
See id. (holding high school violated First Amendment rights by suspending Levy from
cheerleading team). Although the school’s regulatory interests remained significant in some offcampus circumstances, certain features of off-campus speech diminish the strength of Frist Amendment leeway granted to school officials. Id.
6
See id. (providing background context to incident).
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cheerleading team.7 The following weekend, while visiting a local convenience store, Levy used her personal smartphone to broadcast two photos to
her Snapchat followers for a period of twenty-four hours.8 The first photo
displayed Levy raising her middle finger with the caption, “Fuck school fuck
softball fuck cheer fuck everything.”9 Levy’s cheerleading coaches became
aware of her posts after several of Levy’s Snapchat friends distributed
screenshots of these posts.10 After determining that the profanity used in the
posts violated team and school rules, the coaches suspended Levy from the
junior varsity cheerleading team for the upcoming year.11
When the school refused to reverse the suspension, Levy and her
parents sought relief in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, arguing that such punishment violated Levy’s First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.12 The district court granted a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction ordering the school to
reinstate Levy to the cheerleading team.13 In a subsequent decision, the district court granted Levy’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Levy’s
punishment violated the First Amendment.14 The school district later appealed, arguing that Levy was appropriately disciplined given the standard
applied in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.15
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s
7

See id. at 2043 (describing Levy’s frustration). Levy was particularly unsatisfied with the
coach’s decision when she learned the cheerleading squad coaches had placed an entering freshman
on the varsity team. Id.
8
See B.L., 141 S. Ct. at 2043 (detailing off-campus incident). Snapchat allows its users to post
photos and videos that disappear after a set period of time. Id. Levy posted her two photos on
Snapchat via the “story” feature of the application, which allowed any person in her “friend” group
to view the images for a twenty-four-hour period. Id.
9
See id. (providing context of profanity via personal social media platform).
10
See id. (describing connection back to school campus and officials). One of Levy’s Snapchat “friends” belonging to the cheerleading squad used a separate cellphone to take pictures of
Levy’s posts before sharing them with other members of the cheerleading team. Id. That week,
several cheerleaders and other students approached the cheerleading coaches. Id. The coaches
were then able to view a copy of Levy’s speech via screenshots produced by other students. Id.
11
See id. at 2043 (detailing punishment taken by school officials). The cheerleading coaches
discussed the matter with the principal to reach a joint conclusion of school violation. Id. The
school’s athletic director, principal, superintendent, and school board all later affirmed Levy’s suspension from the team on grounds that the post used profanity in connection with a school extracurricular activity. Id.
12
See B.L. ex. rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d. 607, 611 (M.D. Pa.
2017) (explaining family’s effort to seek relief).
13
See id. at 609 (outlining District Court’s disagreement with school’s punishment).
14
See B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 432 (M.D. Pa. 2019)
(stating District Court final judgment on the merits), aff’d, 964 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2020), aff’d but
criticized, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
15
See B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. 964 F.3d 170, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2020) (outlining school
district’s argument).
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decision, holding that the school district’s actions could not be justified using
the Tinker standard because Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech.16
After accepting the school district’s petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Third Circuit’s holding as to the violation of Levy’s First
Amendment rights, but noted that the First Amendment does not entirely
prohibit regulation of off-campus speech.17
The right to express opinions without government interference is a
democratic ideal that dates back to ancient Greece.18 The Framers codified
this ideal when drafting the First Amendment as part of the Bill of Rights,
providing constitutional protection for speech and expression.19 While the
bounds of First Amendment have evolved over time, the Supreme Court has
always recognized that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”20 In
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, the Supreme Court set
the standard for free speech in one area of ambiguity—public schools.21 For
16

See id. at 175, 189 (affirming lower court’s application of First Amendment principles). The
court defined “off-campus” speech as “speech that is outside school-owned, -operated, or -supervised channels and that is not reasonably interpreted as bearing the school’s imprimatur.” Id. at
189. Because Levy’s speech took place off campus and failed to cause an actual or foreseeable
substantial disruption of the school environment, the Third Circuit reasoned that Tinker did not
apply. Id. at 185-86.
17
See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2044 (identifying question for certiorari review); Id. at 2048 (affirming violation of First Amendment rights as found by
lower courts). Although the Court agreed with the Third Circuit’s conclusion that the school’s
discipline violated the First Amendment, the Court did not agree with the Third Circuit’s reasoning.
Id. “Unlike the Third Circuit, we do not believe the special characteristics that give schools additional license to regulate student speech always disappear when a school regulates speech that takes
place off campus.” Id. at 2045.
18
See Keith Werhan, The Classical Athenian Ancestry of American Freedom of Speech, 2009
SUP. CT. REV. 293, 296 (2009) (outlining freedom of speech as fundamental element of democracies). Although Athens and America are different, their democratic structures have created a close
connection in the principles of freedom of speech practiced in Athens and now protected in America. Id.; see also Freedom of Speech, HISTORY, https://perma.cc/7WAR-F2SY (last visited Oct.
13, 2021) (providing timeline of freedom of speech within democratic framework).
19
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing freedom of speech, press, redress, religion, and
assembly).
20
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (holding First Amendment rights must be carefully
protected against infringement).
21
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (ruling in
favor of students’ right to wear armbands as form of free speech). In Tinker, public high school
students engaged in a silent protest against the Vietnam War by wearing armbands to school. Id.
at 504. The students were suspended from school on the grounds that the armbands were a distraction and could possibly lead to danger for other students. Id. at 504-05; see also HISTORY, supra
note 18 (outlining first instance of Court ruling in favor of students). Such protections extend only
to public schools because private schools are not government actors. See Philip A. Dynia, Rights
of Students, FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/5MEC-ENLG (last visited Oct.
14, 2021) (differentiating lack of constitutional limits on private school institutions compared to
public schools).
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the first time, the Supreme Court recognized that public school students do
not “shed their constitutional rights to free speech at the schoolhouse gate.”22
Despite this recognition, the Court noted that school officials’ restriction of
speech is justified when (1) actual disturbances on school premises in fact
occur, or (2) substantial disruption or material interference with school activities are reasonably foreseeable by school officials.23
In the decades following Tinker, the Supreme Court has carved out
broad exceptions to shield school officials from First Amendment violations
when regulating on-campus speech.24 These exceptions include the regulation of speech (1) during extracurricular activities, (2) involving the use of
school-sponsored forums, and (3) reasonably believed to be in the promotion
of illegal drug use.25 However, the Court had not explicitly applied Tinker

Constitutional provisions safeguarding individual rights place limits on the government
and its agents, but not on private institutions or individuals. Thus, to speak of the First
Amendment rights of students is to speak of students in public elementary, secondary,
and higher education institutions. Private schools are not government actors and thus
there is no state action trigger.
Id.
22
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”); see also
Dynia, supra note 21 (explaining lessening of school authority in regulating off-campus speech).
23
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (highlighting absence of facts to show foreseeable substantial
disruption). “As we have discussed, the record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference
with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred.”
Id.; see also Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding regulation
permissible because speech “was ‘created for the purpose of inviting others to indulge in disruptive
and hateful conduct,’ which caused an ‘in-school disruption.’”) In Kowalski, a high school senior
student alleged a First Amendment violation after her school suspended her for creating a
MySpace.com webpage largely dedicated to ridiculing a fellow student. Id. at 570. While the
student alleged that school officials were not justified in regulating speech that did not occur during
a “school-related activity,” the Fourth Circuit affirmed that the school officials’ actions were permissible given the circumstances of the speech. Id. at 576. The court recognized the manner of the
speech was “sufficiently connected to the school environment” due to it “materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school . . .
.” Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
24
See Dynia, supra note 21 (outlining evolving jurisprudence on school regulation of student
speech); see also Katherine A. Ferry, Comment, Reviewing the Impact of the Supreme Court’s
Interpretation of “Social Media” as Applied to Off-Campus Student Speech, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
717, 721 (2018) (“However, all of these issues and subsequent restrictions on speech were enacted
to regulate speech occurring inside the schoolhouse, leaving the protection of speech made outside
school grounds open to debate.”)
25
See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684-85 (1986) (holding regulation of
vulgar speech undermining educational mission does not violate First Amendment). In Fraser, a
public high school student delivered a speech as part of a school-sponsored educational program to
nominate a fellow student for a student office. See id. at 677. Because the student used a graphic
and explicit sexual metaphor as part of his speech, the Court held that the school district acted
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to off-campus speech, creating a circuit split as to the correct approach for
determining the school’s authority in regulating off-campus student
speech.26 The Second Circuit has justified the regulation of off-campus
speech when such speech creates a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption
within the school environment.27 The Fourth Circuit also addressed the issue, holding that where the “nexus” of off-campus speech is “sufficiently
strong” to the school’s teaching interests, school officials are permitted to
take disciplinary action.28 The Ninth Circuit combines the approaches of the
Second and Fourth Circuits, permitting regulation of off-campus speech
when it is “reasonably foreseeable the speech will reach the school

within its permissible authority in sanctioning the student for the speech. Id. at 685; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (permitting student speech regulation
in school-sponsored activities). In Kuhlmeier, public high school students asserted a First Amendment violation after school officials removed their article submissions from the school’s newspaper.
See Hazelwood Sch. Dis., 484 U.S. at 262. The Court ultimately held that school officials were
permitted to exercise control over school-sponsored expressive activities. Id. at 276; see also Morse
v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (“[W]e hold that schools may take steps to safeguard those
entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug
use.”). In Morse, at a school-supervised event, students unfurled a banner conveying a message
that the principal reasonably regarded as promoting illegal drug use. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 39698. The Court held that because such a display took place “at school,” school officials acted within
their authority when confiscating the banner and suspending students. Id. at 401; see also FIRE,
Free Speech in High School, https://perma.cc/TDD9-M9KN (last visited Oct. 16, 2021) (“Taken
together, these four cases [Tinker, Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, Hazelwood Sch. Dist., Morse] give
public high school officials more leeway to regulate speech than public college administrators,
although some states have passed laws to provide additional protection for high school students.”)
26
See Dennis O’Brien & Christie R. Jacobson, Split among circuit courts raises questions on
regulating disruptive off-campus speech, N.Y. STATE ASS’N OF SCHOOL ATT’YS,
https://perma.cc/6XLF-YVU6 (last visited Oct. 14, 2021) (discussing circuit court discrepancies
regarding off-campus speech); Frank D. Lomonte, The Supreme Court’s Cheerleader Decision Has
Something to Frustrate and Disappoint Everyone, FUTURE TENSE (June 25, 2021, 12:07 PM),
https://perma.cc/GZ7P-PVVK (highlighting school speech disputes among jurisdictions); Ferry,
supra note 24, at 722 (“Because of this inconsistency, there is currently an unequal application of
the First Amendment to students’ rights, which results in students’ geographical location having a
large impact on whether their speech will be protected.”); see also Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch.
Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619-20 (5th Cir. 2004) (surveying differing conclusions as to legality of restrictions on off-campus speech). “Frustrated by these inconsistencies, commentators have begun
calling for courts to more clearly delineate the boundary line between off-campus speech entitled
to greater First Amendment protection, and on-campus speech subject to greater regulation.” See
Porter, 393 F.3d at 619-20.
27
See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 349 (2d Cir. 2011) (detailing type of activities considered substantially disruptive); Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent.
Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir. 2007) (providing superintendent’s definition of substantial
disruption as creating disorder to school activities). The Second Circuit agreed with the Ninth
Circuit that “[t]he question is not whether there has been actual disruption, but whether school
officials ‘might reasonably portend disruption’ from the student expression at issue.” Doninger,
642 F.3d at 349, (quoting LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001)).
28
See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (holding nexus of speech to school’s pedagogical interests
strong enough to justify school’s disciplinary action).
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community,” and such regulation has a “sufficient nexus” to the school’s
pedagogical interests.29
In contrast, the Third Circuit maintains that off-campus speech is
protected speech not subject to school regulation.30 The Third Circuit has
also held that a public school’s authority to regulate disruptive speech under
Tinker only applies when substantial disruption is reasonably foreseeable.31
The Fifth Circuit has similarly held that school officials cannot infringe on
students’ constitutional rights where the exercise of such rights does not
“materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school.”32 Such sharp conflict among the
circuits suggested a need for the Supreme Court to provide clarity to both
students and school officials in the regulation of off-campus speech.33
29
See McNeil ex rel. CLM v. Sherwood Sch. Dist. 88J, 918 F.3d 700, 707-08 (9th Cir. 2019)
(combining reasonable foreseeability and “sufficient nexus” requirements to justify speech regulation).

We now clarify that courts considering whether a school district may constitutionally
regulate off-campus speech must determine, based on the totality of circumstances,
whether the speech bears a sufficient nexus to the school. This test is flexible and factspecific, but the relevant considerations will include (1) the degree and likelihood of
harm to the school caused or augured by the speech, (2) whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach and impact the school, and (3) the relation between
the content and context of the speech and the school. There is always a sufficient nexus
between the speech and the school when the school district reasonably concludes that it
faces a credible, identifiable threat of school violence.
Id. (citations omitted).
30
See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011)
(rejecting argument off-campus speech was subject to punishment); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt.
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding schools cannot punish off-campus online
speech even if vulgar, lewd, or offensive).
31
See J.S., 650 F.3d at 930-31 (holding no forecast of substantial disruption where student did
not intend speech to reach school); see also Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216 (holding school violated
student’s constitutional rights in regulating off-campus speech). “It would be an unseemly and
dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s
home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control that child when he/she
participates in school sponsored activities.” Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216; see also Erica Goldberg,
In Third Circuit, Landmark Victories for Student Speech Limit Schools’ Ability To Censor Students
Online, FIRE: NEWSDESK (June 14, 2011), https://perma.cc/WG4K-UTM4 (explaining Third Circuit’s respect for students’ off-campus speech).
32
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (ruling that students who protested
racial discrimination had no interference with school operations); cf. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch.
Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 397 (5th Cir. 2015) (permitting disciplinary action against student due to forecasted substantial disruption with school operations). The school board’s disciplinary action
against the student for a rap song recorded off-campus was justified on grounds that the rap song
recording described violent acts against two named coaches and intended to reach the school community. Id. at 384-85.
33
See Mark Strasser, Tinker Remorse: On Threats, Boobies, Bullying, and Parodies, 15 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 1, 1 (2016) (highlighting difficulty in applying consistent First Amendment
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In Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., the Supreme Court affirmed the
Third Circuit’s ruling that the school district’s disciplinary action violated
the First Amendment.34 The Court acknowledged that, under Tinker, students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression” upon entering the schoolhouse gate.35 While school officials’ authority
is heightened when regulating speech that “materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others,” the Court
found no evidence of such “substantial disruption” of a school activity nor a
threatened harm to the rights of others.36 Instead, the Court emphasized that
the strength of the school’s anti-vulgarity interest and apprehension of disturbance was substantially weakened because Levy transmitted speech outside of the school’s location and hours, and the speech neither identified the
school nor targeted members of its community.37 Thus, the Court reasoned
that the school’s regulatory interests in disciplining Levy were insufficient
to overcome her First Amendment rights, holding that a school’s regulatory
interests are lessened when a student engages in off-campus social media
speech.38
doctrine in public schools). “Until the United States Supreme Court offers a coherent analysis of
the existing jurisprudence that offers guidance on several issues on which there is a split, lower
courts will continue to offer increasingly incompatible interpretations of the jurisprudence . . . .”
Id.; see also Ferry, supra note 24, at 765 (explaining student confusion due to lack of judicial clarity). “These overbroad policies leave students confused and give administrators too much power
to decide what constitutes permissible expression and what should be subject to discipline.” Ferry,
supra note 24, at 765.
34
See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (2021) (“Unlike the Third
Circuit, we do not believe the special characteristics that give schools additional license to regulate
student speech always disappear when a school regulates speech that takes place off campus.”)
35
See id. at 2044 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)). The Court noted the First Amendment serves as a significant measure of protection
granted to minors, especially when schools act in loco parentis. Id. at 2044-45.
36
See id. at 2047-48 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513) (outlining elements of record that oppose
disruption of school activity). The record showed that the content of Levy’s Snapchats had only
temporarily upset some of her cheerleading teammates. Id. at 2047-48. Moreover, the discussion
of the matter occupied less than ten minutes of an Algebra class. Id. When one of Levy’s coaches
was questioned about whether she had any reason to think this incident would disrupt school activities, she responded, “No.” Id. at 2048.
37
See B.L., 141 S. Ct. at 2047 (“[T]hese facts convince us that the school’s interest in teaching
good manners is not sufficient, in this case, to overcome B.L.’s interest in free expression.”); Morse
v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (noting student’s same speech would have been protected
in public forum outside of school context); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688
(1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“If respondent had given the same speech outside of the school
environment, he could not have been penalized simply because government officials considered his
language to be inappropriate . . . .”)
38
See B.L., 141 S. Ct. at 2046 (distinguishing school’s efforts regulating off-campus speech
from efforts regulating on-campus speech). The Court expressed concerns that “[R]egulations of
off-campus speech, when coupled with regulations of on-campus speech, include all the speech a
student utters during the full 24-hour day.” Id.
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In justifying its decision, the Court identified three features of offcampus speech that dictate a regulatory limitation on school officials.39 First,
a student’s off-campus speech likely falls under the responsibility of the student’s parents, as school officials are not acting in loco parentis.40 The Court
then noted that Levy spoke in circumstances where her parents had the responsibility in deciding whether to discipline her off-campus speech.41 Second, courts must be particularly skeptical of school efforts to restrict offcampus speech to avoid covering all speech that a student engages in
throughout the day.42 Lastly, schools have a special interest in protecting a
student’s unpopular expressions, especially when off-campus, to maintain
their role as “nurser[ies] of democracy.”43 Although the Court did not go as
far as the Third Circuit in ruling that school officials have no regulatory interest in off-campus student speech, it recognized that certain features of offcampus speech limit the school’s regulatory authority, and the school district’s cited interests in punishing Levy’s speech were insufficient to overcome her First Amendment rights.44

39
See id. at 2045 (“[W]e do not now set forth a broad, highly general First Amendment rule
stating just what counts as ‘off-campus’ speech . . .”). The Court outlined that, taken together, these
three features of off-campus speech—schools not standing in loco parentis, 24-hour regulation, and
protecting democracy—diminish the leeway the First Amendment usually grants to schools. Id. at
2046.
40
See id. (stating off-campus speech normally within parental responsibility zone). “The doctrine of in loco parentis treats school administrators as standing in the place of students’ parents
under circumstances where the children’s actual parents cannot protect, guide, and discipline
them.” Id.
41
See id. at 2047 (concluding that school did not stand in loco parentis for B.L.). “[T]he
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children [is] under their
control.” Id. at 2053. (Alito, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)
(reflecting on Western Civilization’s history and culture of parental concern for upbringing of children).
42
See B.L., 141 S. Ct. at 2046 (demanding courts increase skepticism of school efforts to regulate off-campus speech). The Court considered the perspective of the student speaker and recognized that extending a school’s authority to off-campus speech provides no leeway for students to
be free from school intervention at all. Id.
43
See id. (acknowledging representative democracy only works where “marketplace of ideas”
exists). “That protection must include the protection of unpopular ideas, for popular ideas have
less need for protection.” Id. The Court emphasized that schools have a strong interest in ensuring
future generations understand the value of freedom of speech and the right to express their opinion,
even if that opinion is debated. Id.
44
See id. at 2045 (stating school’s regulatory interests significant in some off-campus circumstances). The Court lists several types of off-campus behavior which may call for school regulation
including:

serious or severe bullying or harassment targeting particular individuals; threats aimed
at teachers or other students; the failure to follow rules concerning lessons, the writing
of papers, the use of computers, or participation in other online school activities; and
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Despite the division among circuit courts surrounding the application of the Tinker standard to off-campus student speech, the Court properly
held that the school district’s disciplinary action against Levy violated her
First Amendment rights.45 While public schools may regulate student speech
in certain circumstances, students nevertheless enjoy robust First Amendment rights, particularly when speech occurs off-campus and is directed to a
private audience via a personal cell phone.46 In such circumstances, it is the
parents, not the school, who are in the best position to protect, guide, and
discipline the students if desired.47 Therefore, the Court appropriately recognized in-school and certain off-campus restrictions that are essential to the
operation of a public school.48 An argument in favor of expansive regulation
that encompasses off-campus speech will not only infringe on parental
rights, but it will also challenge the fundamental free-speech principles under
the First Amendment.49
Although the Court sought to resolve the circuit split regarding offcampus speech regulation, it ultimately failed to establish a bright line rule
and instead set forth a vague three-feature test to determine whether schools
may regulate off-campus speech.50 By neglecting to provide a First
breaches of school security devices, including material maintained within school computers.
Id. (itemizing situations in which regulation may be appropriate).
45
See O’Brien & Jacobson, supra note 26 (finding disparate application of Tinker standard to
off-campus speech). See B.L., 141 S. Ct. at 2048 (holding disciplinary action violated B.L.’s First
Amendment rights).
46
See B.L., 141 S. Ct. at 2045 (outlining instances of off-campus behavior permitting school
regulation); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (emphasizing students’ entitlement to comprehensive First Amendment rights).
47
See B.L., 141 S. Ct. at 2046 (outlining in loco parentis doctrine that treats school administrators as standing in place of parents). “In our society, parents, not the State, have the primary
authority and duty to raise, educate, and form the character of their children.” Id. at 2053 (Alito,
J., concurring) (stressing parents do not “implicitly relinquish” authority when they enroll their
children in public school).
48
See id. at 2050 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining schools cannot operate effectively without
authority over in-school speech). The Court expanded schools’ regulatory interests in certain offcampus circumstances that allow for effective authority, including threats aimed at the school community, severe bullying or harassment, and breaches of school security devices. See id. at 2045,
2050 (majority opinion) (rationalizing use of authority over off-campus speech with school safety).
49
See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (stating loss of First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm); see also B.L., 141 S. Ct. at 2053 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing parents’ liberty to direct upbringing and education of children under their control). “While the inschool restrictions discussed above are essential to the operation of a public school system, any
argument in favor of expansive regulation of off-premises speech must contend with this fundamental free-speech principle.” B.L., 141 S. Ct. at 2054 (Alito, J., concurring) (balancing schools’
interest in regulating speech against students’ constitutional protections).
50
See B.L., 141 S. Ct. at 2059 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing majority’s three-feature test is
vague and neglects historical precedent). The dissent considers the narrowness of the Court’s
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Amendment rule explicitly defining what constitutes “off-campus” speech,
the Court engendered further uncertainty by recommending a case-by-case
determination of permissible regulation.51 Instead, the Court should have
adopted a two-step framework that provides parents with discretion to discipline students when the speech in question occurs outside the school environment.52 As parents maintain a fundamental privacy right to act in the best
interest of their child, parents should be the first deciders of student disciplinary action when the conduct is beyond school bounds.53 Where parental
disciplinary action does not go as far as to prevent a “material and substantial
disruption” to school operations, the Court should then adopt the Fourth Circuit’s “nexus” approach and look to factors such as whether the speech directly names the school or targets specific members of the school community.54 Utilizing the “sufficiently strong” nexus approach between offcampus speech and the school environment would justify disciplinary action
by school officials should the parental actions fail to remedy the disruption.55
holding by noting questions remain about how to apply the doctrine of in loco parentis. See id. at
2059, 2061-62 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“How much less authority do schools have over off-campus speech and conduct? And how does a court decide if speech is on or off campus?”)
51
See id. at 2045 (majority opinion) (acknowledging persistent discrepancy in First Amendment standards).
Thus, we do not now set forth a broad, highly general First Amendment rule stating just
what counts as “off campus” speech and whether or how ordinary First Amendment
standards must give way off campus to a school’s special need to prevent, e.g., substantial disruption of learning-related activities or the protection of those who make up a
school community.
Id. (recognizing unresolved tensions in determining what qualifies as “off campus” speech for regulatory purposes).
52
See id. at 2053 (Alito, J., concurring) (“While the decision to enroll a student in a public
school may be regarded as conferring the authority to regulate some off-premises speech . . . enrollment cannot be treated as a complete transfer of parental authority over a student’s speech.”)
53
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western
civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established
beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (emphasizing parents’ liberty to guide and
control child upbringing). The Court emphasized that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the
state,” and those who care for him and “direct his destiny” have the right and obligation to choose
how to care for him. Id. (making distinction between parents’ authority and state’s authority).
54
See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying “nexus”
approach in upholding discipline of direct verbal attacks towards specifically named classmate).
The Fourth Circuit asserted that such a direct, public target on a named classmate rose to a level of
harassment and bullying which would be expected “to reach the school or impact the school environment” and that therefore, the school had the ability to discipline the student. Id. at 573-74.
55
See id. at 577 (“Suffice it to hold here that, where such speech has a sufficient nexus with
the school, the Constitution is not written to hinder school administrator’s’ good faith efforts to
address the problem.”)
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As technology continues to evolve and more young people gain access to social media, online speech will only expand the ways in which students engage and communicate.56 As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic,
the dividing line between off-campus and on-campus speech is even more
blurred with the onset of remote learning.57 Although the educational system
has partially transitioned into the private home, once a student enters the virtual “schoolhouse gate” via a school-sponsored forum, the student’s speech
should nevertheless be considered on-campus speech subject to discipline by
school authority.58 By properly drawing a clear boundary line, courts would
possess the necessary clarity for determining when and where a student engages in off-campus speech.59 While the Supreme Court’s decision marked
a victory for Levy and students’ free speech rights, the Court’s decision
failed to answer the desperate pleas for clarity by jurisdictions and school
administrators nationwide.60
The right to be free in one’s expressions is guaranteed by the First
Amendment of the Constitution. By limiting the ability of school officials
to police students’ expressions outside of school, the Court has demonstrated
56

See Ferry, supra note 24, at 719 (discussing social media’s influence on secondary school
setting due to teenagers’ usage). “While the Internet is widely used and available to all age groups,
teenagers report using the Internet the most, facilitated by the convenience and efficiency of
smartphones.” Id.
57
See Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The line dividing
fully protected ‘“off-campus’” speech from less protected ‘“on-campus’” speech is unclear . . .”);
see also Lomonte, supra note 26 (“Most have simply adapted Tinker in refereeing school disciplinary disputes, as if there were no legal difference between speaking inside a classroom and speaking at home on a Saturday.”)
58
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (holding public
school officials may regulate speech that would “materially and substantially disrupt the work and
discipline of the school”); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)
(permitting regulation of lewd and vulgar speech within school activity). While upholding First
Amendment protections, the law has developed to integrate circumstances where the absolute exercise of free speech rights would interfere with the pedagogical interests of the school. Fraser,
478 U.S. at 684 (finding regulatory powers applicable at assembly due to it being a school-sponsored forum).
59
See B.L., 141 S. Ct. at 2063 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In effect, it [the Court] states just one
rule: Schools can regulate speech less often when that speech occurs off campus. It then identifies
this case as an ‘example’ and ‘leav[es] for future cases’ the job of developing this new commonlaw doctrine.”) (alteration in original).
60
See Lomonte, supra note 26 (explaining great disappointment in Court’s lack of guidance
to future cases). The Supreme Court takes cases like Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. to
“make enduring, broad statements of principle—legal rules, tests, and standards—that can guide
future courts in similar cases and enable the rest of us to predict whether our behavior will be
grounds for arrest, firing, or a year off from JV cheerleading.” Id. However, the Court did just the
opposite in leaving unanswered many pivotal questions regarding the contours of off-campus
speech that will likely arise in future scenarios of online student speech. Id. (“Here is what we
know to a certainty after Wednesday [date of Court’s decision]: It’s OK to flip off your school on
Snapchat. And here is what we do not know to a certainty: everything else.”)
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its firm commitment to protecting free speech and recognizing its importance
in our democracy. However, in failing to set forth a bright line rule that
explicitly defines off-campus speech, the Court inadvertently authorized
school districts to implement their own specific discipline policies as to such
speech, ultimately allowing for further inconsistencies to arise. School districts, and the jurisdictions in which they reside, will continue to struggle
with students’ First Amendment rights and its interplay with social media
and beyond.
Angela Bartucca

